Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Nontechnical Summary
Fiscal arrangements for sharing income risk and redistributing income across different regions of a national state or across the states forming a federation have received considerable interest in recent research. Much of this interest was sparked by the preparation of European Monetary Union during the 1990s where a fiscal tax and transfer system has been considered as an alternative to the exchange rate instrument for absorbing asymmetric shocks. Other contributions have looked at the role of the fiscal system in improving the performance of economies with incomplete capital markets that do not allow consumers to insure against regionally asymmetric shocks. Much of the empirical work in this area has been done using data from the US and Canada.
In this paper, we analyze the risksharing and redistributive properties of Germany's system of fiscal equalization, the principal arrangement for tax revenue sharing and transfers among the states of the German federation and between these and the federal government. We use data from 1961 to 1994, the last year before the inclusion of the East german states in the system, for a panel analysis. We are interested in two main aspects of the system: To what extent does it provide insurance against asymmetric shocks to the individual states, and to what extent does it provide systematic redistribution from rich to poor states.
A first result is that fiscal equalization provides almost no insurance against asymmetric shocks to state GDPs. Furthermore, it provides very little redistribution from states with high to states with low per-capita GDPs. In contrast, fiscal equalization perfectly insures state budgets against fluctuations in per capita tax collections around the federal average. Fiscal equalization also results in significant redistribution of tax revenues from states where per capita tax collections are low to states where per capita tax revenues are high. Both the degree of insurance provided and the extent of tax-revenue redistribution have increased over time. Thus, fiscal equalization in Germany can be best understood as a system for risksharing and redistribution among state governments rather than consumers in different states. The model presented in section 2 of this paper suggests that this can be explained by the desire to insure risk-averse consumers against fluctuations in the provision of local public goods.
An important critique against fiscal equalization holds that large transfers among states lead to adverse incentive effects for governments to develop and maintain a healthy tax base in their own states. The model we present in section 2 shows that this argument is too simple. If fiscal equalization provides significant insurance against shocks to tax revenues, an increase in the transfers under fiscal equalization may well induce more rather than less tax effort. The reason is that local governments are encouraged to produce more public goods if fiscal equalization allows for a steadier supply of these goods over time.
In the last section of this paper, we show that the elasticity of state tax revenues with regard to fluctuations in state GDPs has steadly declined over the 35 years under consideration. This is weakly consistent with the view that more redistribution among states leads to lower tax effort. But the empirical evidence suggests that the argument has been overplayed in the recent debate about fiscal equalization in Germany.
Introduction
Fiscal arrangements for sharing income risk and redistributing income across different regions of a national state or across the states forming a federation have received considerable interest in recent research. Much of this interest was sparked by the preparation of European Monetary Union during the 1990s.The literature has looked at such arrangements from two different angles. Following the tradition of Mundell's (1961) analysis of currency unions, one branch of the literature considers the importance of fiscal arrangements among regions or states sharing the same currency as mechanisms for regional economic stabilization, i.e., as a substitute for exchange rate flexibility. The basic idea of this approach is nicely summarized in a quote by Jacques Delors, the former president of the European Commission, in the Delors-Report (1989, p.89) Following this approach, the MacDougall Report (European Commission, 1977a, b) , which considered the conditions for monetary union in Europe already in the 1970s, and, more recently, Sachs and Sala-I-Martin (1991), von Hagen (1992), Goodhart and Smith (1993) , Masson (1997, 1998) , Melitz and Zumer (1998) provide empirical estimates of the extent to which fiscal arrangements in existing federations provide insurance against region or state-specific shocks to aggregate output. The empirical results of the more recent studies indicate that federal fiscal arrangements in practice absorb between 10 and 20 percent of the impact of asymmetric shocks, much less than Delors' quote would suggest.
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The other branch of the literature considers the role of national or federal fiscal arrangements for consumption risk-sharing among consumers living in different regions of a country or federation (Persson and Tabellini 1996a, b; Bucovetsky 1998) . Here, the motivation is that fiscal arrangements may improve consumption smoothing in the presence of incomplete capital markets. Empirical contributions following this approach include Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993) , Sorensen and Yosha (1997) , Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996), van Wincoop (1995) and Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1998) . Persson and Tabellini (1996a,b) analyze the political economy of regional risk-sharing arrangements. They argue that there is a trade-off between redistribution and risk-sharing among the regions of a federation and find that underinsurance is a likely outcome of inter-governmental transfer schemes.
The empirical work in both strands of this literature has concentrated on the US and Canada and provided only some evidence for other federations or nations.
This paper provides new empirical evidence of the risk-sharing and redistributive properties of fiscal equalization in Germany. Germany is a particularly interesting case in this context, because, like Canada and in contrast to the US, it has an explicit, formula-based mechanism for fiscal equalization, Finanzausgleich (FA), which is defined by the federal constitution.
2 The German case has not received much attention in the empirical literature, most likely because of the intricacies of the formal arrangement and the difficulties to find the appropriate data.
In section II, we begin our analysis with the development of a stylized model of horizontal fiscal equalization. The model serves to motivate an important point in the empirical work, i.e., the distinction between fiscal equalization targeting differentials in private sector incomes across regions and fiscal equalization targeting regional government tax collections. By focusing entirely on regional risk sharing, the existing literature misses important aspects of fiscal equalization in Germany, where interregional transfers to households play only a minor role.
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Section III gives a description of FA. In section IV, we explore the extent to which it serves as a buffer against regional income shocks and against shocks to local government tax collections. Furthermore, we explore the redistributional aspects of FA, both in terms of per capita GDPs and state tax revenues. We find, first, that FA provides no insurance against state-specific income shocks and very small redistribution relative to state-specific differences in per-capita GDP. Second, we find that FA provides perfect insurance of state tax revenues against asymmetric shocks and very significant redistribution of state tax collections. Thus, FA is best 1 See von Hagen (2000) for a review of the empirical results.
2 As in Canada, equalization is considered to be an outflow of a constitutional mandate to provide equal living conditions for all citizens throughout the federation.
3 Kunz (2000) shows that such transfers are provided to some extent by Germany's unemployment insurance.
understood as a mechanism for insuring state budgets rather than regional economies and for equalizing the distribution of tax revenues across states.
The observation that FA redistributes tax revenues among the states of Germany has lead to the argument that it creates negative incentives for states collecting taxes and developing their tax bases (e.g. Baretti et al 2000; Büttner 1999 ).
Our theoretical model suggests that this argument is too simple, as it neglects the insurance aspect of horizontal equalization. In the last part of section IV, we show that the link between state tax collections and GDP is weak in Germany, and has become weaker over time. The evidence is consistent with the operation of negative incentive effects, but these effects may be weaker than what is generally suggested in the public debate. Section V concludes.
II. Principles of Regional Risk Sharing and Redistribution
In a world of perfect capital markets, the government has no role in providing private consumers with insurance against income shocks, as every individual could buy the amount of insurance he desires in the market. Insurance against regional shocks can be achieved by cross-ownership of productive assets or through lending and borrowing on credit markets. There might still be fiscal arrangements for redistributing income between individuals living in different regions of a country, but these would target permanent income differentials across regions rather than deal with region-specific income risk. In a world with incomplete capital markets, however, consumption smoothing can be improved by fiscal transfers between regions. The literature typically considers regional transfer mechanisms providing direct consumption smoothing by pooling regional income risk across regions. It is achieved by a transfer mechanism that collects payments from citizens in individual regions proportional to their incomes and pays transfers proportional to average per capita income. We assume that, due to constitutional constraints, the tax and transfer rates are the same for all citizens in the country, and that the mechanism cannot distinguish between actual and expected income. Thus, if a transfer mechanism aiming at consumption smoothing is in place, individuals in state i receive a net transfer of τ(y t -y it ), where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. These transfers may, of course, run through the budgets of the state governments, but receipts and payments net out, as they are paid directly to households.
An alternative transfer mechanism collects and pays transfers between the state governments on the basis of their tax collections. This intergovernmental transfer scheme makes governments collecting higher than average tax revenues pay a part of their receipts to governments collecting less than average tax revenues.
Thus, the net transfer is β(t t -t it ), where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
With these transfer systems in place we can now reformulate the consumer's and the state budget constraints.
(1) c it = τy t + (1-τ)y it -t it (2) g it = βt t +(1-β)t it .
To derive some characteristics of regional transfer schemes aiming at risk sharing, we now ask, what are the parameters τ and β the representative household in state i would choose? We answer this question by deriving the parameters that maximize the representative household's expected utility given the budget constraints (1) and (2).
Consider first the optimal mechanism for transfers paid to households from the point of view of consumers in region i.
where r i c is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute consumption risk aversion.
Equation (3) contains a number of insights into the properties of regional transfer arrangements. First, since the mechanism does not distinguish between expected and unexpected incomes, it has a purely redistributive part represented by the first term. Regions with relatively low expected incomes would prefer more redistribution, while regions with relatively high expected incomes might even prefer no income smoothing at all.
Second, the optimal risk-sharing arrangement depends on the stochastic characteristics of a region, indicated by the second term of equation (3). In the absence of any differences in expected per capita incomes, the desired degree of consumption smoothing increases as the correlation coefficient declines, i.e., the insurability of incomes across regions increases. Furthermore, the desired degree of consumption smoothing increases with the variance of regional per-capita income relative to the volatility of aggregate per-capita income, unless the correlation coefficient ρ i is large. Intuitively, high-risk regions desire a larger degree of consumption smoothing than low-risk regions.
Third, equation (3) shows that regions with different characteristics desire different consumption smoothing arrangements. The design of a federal system, therefore, entails some compromise among the states. Persson and Tabellini discuss the political economy of such a compromise. While details are beyond the scope of this paper, two points are particularly noteworthy. First, in the presence of differences in expected per-capita incomes across states, the political equilibrium implies a trade-off between redistribution and consumption smoothing which may lead to under-provision of the latter. Second, a political equilibrium may emerge, in which high-risk regions pay a permanent transfer to low-risk regions in return for obtaining a higher degree of insurance than the low-risk regions would choose for themselves.
Thus, a federal arrangement for consumption smoothing may lead to permanent, unconditional transfers even when the expected per capita incomes are the same in all states.
Next, we consider the optimal arrangement for transfers between state governments from the point of view of the representative consumer in Equation (4) shows that the choice of the transfer mechanism between state governments is determined by similar considerations as the transfer mechanism that pays transfers directly to households. As before, the transfer mechanism has a redistributive component, represented by the first term, and an insurance component, aiming at smoothing state tax revenues over time. Nevertheless, equation (4) is interesting in its own right, because it shows that there is a scope for horizontal fiscal transfers among the states of a federation even if these transfers are uncorrelated with regional income shocks and are not used to improve household consumption
smoothing.
An important aspect of horizontal transfer arrangements is that they may create adverse incentives for the states' tax collection efforts and the development of tax resources (Migue, 1993) . Indeed, the current debate on the reform of FA in Germany focuses strongly on the argument that state governments have too weak incentives to improve tax collections or to develop new taxable resources, because doing so does not pay for the individual government, as most of the additional revenue generated is lost through FA. Baretti et al. (2000) provide empirical evidence that suggests that reducing the amount of horizontal equalization in Germany would increase state tax collections. 
We can then use the envelope theorem to derive the relation between tax effort and the degree of insurance and redistribution achieved through the intergovernmental transfer system.
In equation (5) (5) is negative (i.e., not dominated by µ cc,i ), an increase in the transfer parameter β reduces optimal state tax effort. This effect is stronger for small states and for states with relatively low tax efforts (i.e., with δ i < 0.).
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The third term brings in the state government's demand for insurance against asymmetric tax shocks. This term is negative, if risk aversion with regard to the public good is strong, and its derivative is not too large. Indeed, it seems plausible that the degree of risk aversion with regard to local public goods is quite high. If so, increasing the transfer parameter encourages a state government to spend more tax effort. Intuitively, offering more insurance against asymmetric revenue shocks encourages the government to choose a higher level of public goods provision, which in turn requires higher tax effort. Thus, the empirical observation of a large transfer parameter β does not imply that state governments are vexed with adverse incentives regarding their efforts spent on tax collection and the improvement of local tax sources.
III. Finanzausgleich: Fiscal Equalization in Germany
Finanzausgleich is an arrangement for redistributing tax revenues among the states and the federal government of Germany. 6 The original federal constitution assigned all taxes of unambiguous local incidence to the states, among them personal and corporate income taxes and business taxes, and all other taxes to the federal government. Apart from some minor taxes, this left the federal government with sales taxes, which were later replaced by VAT. 
Here, x it is the flow into or out of state i's budget in year t under FA, and y it stands either for the state's pre-FA tax collections or GDP. Including a time fixed effect α t , the term y it -y it-1 effectively stands for the asymmetric change in y in state i, since the national average will be picked up by the time fixed effect. We also control for state fixed effects, s i . The coefficient ß then estimates the extent to which flows under FA provide insurance against asymmetric tax revenue or GDP shocks. To check the stability of the offsetting coefficients, we reestimated equation (6) results, not reported here to save space, show that none of the dummy variables is significant. We also estimated the equation with instruments for current income, which did not change the results. Furthermore, including one and two lags of the explanatory variable did not turn out to be significant. Overall, we conclude that FA provides almost no insurance against asymmetric GDP shocks to states in Germany.
A very different picture emerges when we turn to the insurance function with regard to tax revenues. Table 4 reports the estimates of the coefficient β allowing for parameter changes over time. Note that the total effect is now the sum of the coefficient estimated for the 1970s plus the coefficient estimated for any other subperiod. While there is no significant difference in the insurance provided during the 1960s and 1970s, the total effect increases from (-0.70) to -(0.92) in the 1980s, i.e., FA provided more insurance of state tax revenues in the 1980s than in the earlier decades. This is reversed, however, in the 1990s, where the additional effect estimated is only (-0.17) and is not statistically significant.
Including supplementary grants in the evaluation of FA (stage 3) gives an even more dramatic result. Here, we find that the insurance provided by the system remained the same throughout 1961-1989. In the 1990s, however, the combined effect of FA changes sign.This indicates that FA including supplementary grants had a destabilizing effect on state tax revenues in the 1990s. 
IV.2 Redistribution Through Finanzausgleich
To assess the redistributive function of FA, we estimate the following equation: 
Here, x t and y t denote the federal average per capita values of the respective variables. As before, t 's are time fixed effects and the s i are state fixed effects. The coefficient γ thus estimates the response of transfer flows under FA to a state's deviation from the average per capita tax revenue or GDP. FA reduces differences in per capita tax revenues or GDP, if γ < 0.
Estimates of equation (7) with time fixed effects alone tell us how transfers under FA respond to the difference between the per-capita GDP of state i and national average per-capita GDP controlling for common trends and business cycle.
This difference consists of a permanent and a transitory part. The former is due to long-term differences in the relative income position of state i reflecting its economic development relative to that national average. The latter is due to fluctuations around this long-run relative position over time. Estimating equation (7) with time and state fixed effects separates these two effects, as the state fixed effects pick up the permanent component of the transfers, and the slope parameter reflects the shortrun component. Table 5 reports the redistributive effects of FA with regard to GDP per capita.
The estimates with time fixed effects only indicate a significant but very small redistributive effect. At the first stage, a difference of per capita GDP of DM 100 between state i and the federal average is compensated by a reduction in FA transfers by 50 pfennig. Stage 2 raises the effect to DM 1.8, stage 3 to DM 2.1.
Estimates with time and state fixed effects lead to a dramatic increase in the adjusted R-squares, but a loss of significance of the slope coefficient at stage 1 and stage 2.
This indicates that the redistributive function with regard to GDP is a permanent one, FA does almost nothing at these stages to compensate states for fluctuation around their long-run relative income positions. However, estimating equation (7) with time and state fixed effects at stage 3 leads to a larger and more significant slope coefficient. This is not surprising. It shows that the supplementary grants, which can be paid with more discretion than the formula-based transfers at stage 1 and stage 2, are used to compensate states for temporary fluctuations around their relative income positions. Table 6 reports our estimates of equation (7) Table 8 reports the estimates of equation (7) We then estimate this equation with time-varying slope coefficients to see how the income elasticity of tax collections changed over time. The results are reported in Table 9 . 
V. Conclusion
This paper presents an analysis of fiscal equalization among the states of the Federal Republic of Germany . Fiscal equalization is a formula-based mechanism redistributing tax revenues between the states, augmented by vertical payments from the Federal Government to individual states. It is an outflow of the constitutional mandate to secure equal living conditions for all citizens in the country.
The theoretical model discussed in this paper shows that, apart from pure income redistribution, fiscal equalization can be motivated by considerations of regional risk sharing among consumers living in different states. Regional risk sharing may aim at insuring consumer incomes against asymmetric, region-specific shocks. Alternatively, regional risk-sharing may aim at insuring state budgets against asymmetric tax revenue shocks, enabling states to smooth the provision of local public goods over time. Counter to conventional wisdom, transfer payments between states do not create adverse incentive effects for states leading to a reduction in tax effort and an insufficient development of local tax bases, if the motivation to insure state budgets against such shocks is sufficiently strong.
Our empirical analysis explores the insurance and redistributive properties of fiscal equalization in Germany, using data from 1961 to 1994. We find that the distinction between insurance aiming at private sector incomes and insurance aiming at state budgets is important. Transfers under fiscal equalization do not correlate strongly with asymmetric shocks to state GDPs. They do, however, strongly offset asymmetric shocks to state tax collections. We conclude that Germany's fiscal equalization is better characterized as an insurance against tax revenue shocks than as a mechanism for offsetting asymmetric shocks to regional incomes.
Similarly, the redistributive properties of fiscal equalization are better characterized with regard to state tax incomes than with regard to per capita GDPs in the states. Transfers under fiscal equalization respond only weakly to differences in per capita GDP across the states. In contrast, they do offset differences in state tax revenues per capita. This offsetting effect is perfect at the margin, but only about fifty percent in the long run. Since the 1970s, redistribution of tax revenues at the margin even overcompensates tax revenue differentials. Thus, states may be better off in times of temporary tax revenue losses than in times of positive revenue shocks.
The result that fiscal equalization leads to significant redistribution of tax revenues across states implies that there is a potential for adverse incentive effects on state tax collections. To explore this issue, we estimate tax revenue functions to see if the link between tax collections and local GDP has changed over time. Our results show that this link has, indeed, become significantly weaker over the 34 years under consideration. This is consistent with the proposition that states have paid less effort on tax enforcement in response to more redistribution of tax revenues through fiscal equalization. However, this effect seems to have been strongest between the 1960s and the 1970s. The ongoing weakening of the link between economic activity and tax collections in the 1980s and 1990s in the German states can hardly be attributed to fiscal equalization.
